Post-communist Russian Identity Crisis and its (Re)Definition as Transpired in President Yeltsin’s Rhetoric

The collapse of the USSR led to both enthusiasm and anxieties, inside and outside the former Soviet space. However, it could be argued that the psychological impact of the fall was particularly colossal on what was to be the Russian Federation: in just a matter of days, the Russians – notably the leadership and elite – were forced to at least acknowledge that they were no longer rulers over a transcontinental empire which had also been the gravitational centre for numerous satellites. This led to a heavy feeling of insecurity and weakness. Arguably the most painful dimension was that the Russians felt that their international status was severely deteriorated and that the Russian state was, at best, considered to be a regional power, which was a major plunge from the status of one of the only two world superpowers. Hence, there were changes recorded on multiple layers: modified territory and population, a new regime was struggling to draw its face, different perceptions of the Russian state on regional and international level. These all led to a notable identity crisis whose clarification was crucial not only for dealing with the inherent economic crisis, but also for the future of the Russian state itself and its relations with the international community. Under these coordinates, the first elected Russian leader, president Yeltsin embarked upon the arduous task of declaring to the domestic and international public who and what Russia was. A brief look into his rhetoric unveils how, on the one hand, the new type identity president Yeltsin described would have made Russia a member of the democratic club; on the other hand, the role identity turned out to be problematic. While the president proclaimed Russia to have dropped its imperialist desires and the newly created CIS was a voluntary structure based on principles such as equality of states, it was also him to declare in 1994 that “Russia is the first among equals, it’s the gravitational centre of brotherly-states”, hinting at the past, rather than a new role identity for the new Russian state. Considering these preliminary observations, the paper aims to address the questions: How did president Yeltsin describe Russia’s personal identity? How did the president describe the system that was developing in the Federation? What role did Yeltsin envision for Russia? And, ultimately, how did the leader attempt to postulate a collective identity for the former Soviet space? These are all crucial aspects to investigate in order to understand not only the specificities of the 1990s, but also the current Russian system and its relations with the former Soviet states, especially with Ukraine. Analysing the president’s rhetoric with the help of discourse analysis and interpreting the main ideas Yeltsin presented to the public through the filter presented by the constructivist theory of IR are valuable tools in the endeavour of offering pertinent answers to the above questions and establishing whether the leader contoured a new national identity for Russia or added yet another link in the millennial imperialist Russian identity.