Action and reaction: Political control and bureaucratic resistance in the Brazilian populist context

Scholars have widely discussed the tensions and conflicts between politicians and bureaucrats during the 20th century (Weber 1954, Rockman et al., 1981). This literature usually analyzed the different forms of political control or the practices and behaviors enacted by bureaucrats under a democratic context (Hirshman, 1970; Brehm & Gates, 1999; Lipsky, 2010; Gofen, 2014; Tummers et al., 2015; Cooper, 2018). More recently, scholars began to show how these phenomena occur under contexts of democratic and institutional weakness, both under democratic backsliding and populist regimes (Bauer and Becker, 2020; Moynihan, 2021; Bauer et al., 2021; Peters and Pierre, 2020). Authors show that, under these contexts, politicians develop different strategies to gain their loyalty; sideling, or empowering them (Bauer and Becker, Peters and Pierre, 2020). Although all these studies advanced in understanding forms of political control and bureaucratic actions, they usually observe these phenomena as static ones. Concepts as shirking, sabotage, exit, voice, guerrilla, among others, appear as unilateral decisions made by bureaucrats aimed to achieve their individual or collective objectives. However, bureaucratic actions may be a reaction to forms of political control and that forms of political control may be a response to bureaucratic actions. Therefore, we still miss a theoretical framework showing how this relational process happens. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature by analyzing the relational dimension and learning process behind the forms of political control and bureaucratic reactions. Empirically, we examine the Brazilian case of politicians and bureaucrats under Bolsonaro's government. The question that guides our analysis is: how does the dynamic between political control and bureaucratic reactions occur in contexts of democratic backsliding? The analysis draws on data collected between December 2020 and July 2021 in 14 different Brazilian federal organizations in social, economic, environmental, and planning sectors. Data were collected using an online survey with 1,147 responses and 154 interviews with mid-level bureaucrats. We compare the forms of political control and bureaucratic reactions among different sectors. Findings suggest that these forms vary considering the measures used (formal or informal) and the scale of action (individual or collective). Data suggest that this variation is based on some sector’s characteristics, as the degree of bureaucratic institutionalization and the degree of organizational politicization. Based on this variation, we propose typology of actions and reactions based on these differences: 1. Formal and individual; 2. Informal and individual; 3. Formal and collective; 4. Informal and Collective. The findings suggest that political control and bureaucratic resistance is a dynamic that involves interactions and the learning process over time. As politicians and bureaucrats interact, learn and adapt the actions and reactions, they change their strategies. At the same time, the capacity to learn and adapt is influenced by contextual characteristics, as the degree of institutionalization and politicization. Our research contributes to the debate on democratic backsliding, populism, and public administration, proposing different analytical dimensions to understanding the dynamics behind the relations between authoritarian governments and public administration.