ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Parliaments in Separation of Powers Systems

Valeria Palanza
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Gisela Sin
Valeria Palanza
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Gisela Sin

Abstract

This paper analyzes legislative bargaining in a context of fragmented multi-partisan congress, where bill passage depends largely on coalition support and the executive holds veto power. It provides evidence that vetoes, especially partial vetoes, are part of the bargaining process all along, and that presidents in such fragmented legislatures are more likely to use partial vetoes when their grip on their coalition is stronger. In contrast to dominant claims in the literature, which predict more vetoes when the president has weaker control over their coalition, we argue that when presidential control over the congressional coalition is tight, the likelihood of partial vetoes increases. Under such conditions, presidents anticipate that reversals to their vetoes are unlikely, and delete parts selectively. We analyze all statutes and executive decrees approved and vetoed in Brazil, a multi-party democracy, between 1988 and 2010.