The Young and the Hawkish? Generational Differences in Conflict Attitudes in Israel

In societies living in intractable conflict, what kind of generational patterns characterize public opinion on the conflict? Should younger generations exhibit higher or lower levels of support in conflict resolution compared to older cohorts? While vast literature examines the effect of growing up in conflicts on children and adolescents, we know fairly little about aggregate generational gaps in public attitudes toward conflict resolution, which have great potential to transform overall public opinion. Some suggest that younger generations should pronounce more pro-resolution attitudes, as it might be easier for them to leave the shadows of the conflict behind and focus instead on the present and on making a better future. However, studies show that socialization under conflict tends to replicate the conflict’s worldviews, perceptions, and in-group and out-group stereotypes among young children. Also, evidence shows that exposure to massive violence might create collective traumas with long-lasting effects on members of subsequent cohorts for decades later. This kind of evidence argues against the possibility of generational differences in public support for conflict resolution, as they generally predict similar attitudes for all cohorts. Yet, a third approach emphasizes the impact of the conditions prevailing during the “impressionable years” on the formation of political attitudes, so that people who were socialized during different phases of the conflict may hold different attitudes depending on the phase in which they were socialized. Which of these approaches better explains generational patterns of public opinion on conflict attitudes, especially in intractable conflicts which last several generations? To answer this question, I focus on Israeli-Jews’ public attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Using longitudinal data from surveys covering the period of 1977-2021, I examine the level of support in conflict resolution among members of different cohorts. I find that generational gaps did not characterize public opinion until the beginning of the 2000s. However, since then, young Israeli Jews have pronounced much more hawkish attitudes than older generations' members. While this change could have been attributed to the major violent wave of the Second Intifada (2001-2004), results show that the generational gap is getting even wider for members of the youngest cohort, who did not experience these events personally. Overall, I find support for the “no generational differences” approach for the first investigated period, while the following decades support the impact of impressionable years. What led to the emergence of generational gaps? I examine the mediating effects of perceptions of national threat and hope for peace. On the way, I rule out several other explanations, such as demographic changes, lifecycle effects, and perceptions of personal threat. The findings highlight the changes in the ethos of conflict and hope for peace in the last two decades and their major influence on the members of younger cohorts. If these are indeed cohort rather than lifecycle effects, as the data suggest, they raise important questions about the overall change in support for peace among the Israeli-Jewish society, with significant implications for the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.