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Did Brexit Tame Euroscepticism?

Comparative Politics
Populism
Euroscepticism
Party Systems
Brexit
Member States
Gianfranco Baldini
Università di Bologna
Gianfranco Baldini
Università di Bologna
Chiara Fiorelli
Sapienza University of Rome
Andrea Pareschi
Università di Bologna

Abstract

Among the most widespread fears fuelled by the 2016 Brexit referendum, the idea of a possible rise in Euroscepticism throughout Europe was a very relevant and immediate concern. So far, the main evidence provided by the literature has been based on the first general elections taking place in a selected number of countries (Van Kessel et al. (2020), on France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), downplaying the phenomenon to some extent. Two years before, these four countries had been related to different degrees of impact of Brexit on party Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018), respectively deemed to be low in Germany and the Netherlands, but medium in France and high in Italy. In this paper we build on these and other works to replicate and enlarge Van Kessel et al.’s contribution, with a view to assessing the medium-term effects of Brexit on the same selected countries. This allows to maximize replicability, while also combining quantitative data with more qualitative insights. Our research innovates the field in three main ways. First, we build a new dataset that cross-checks recent prominent assessments by experts on populism and Euroscepticism (such as PopuList (2019), Mudde (2021), Taggart and Pirro (2021)) in order to ascertain the electoral results of Eurosceptic parties. This strategy enlarges the scope of the research across the political spectrum, resulting in the inclusion of other parties than just the populist radical right). Second, our assessment is tailored around the 2016 UK referendum, allowing us to distinguish two six-year time periods (2011/first half of 2016, vs. second half- 2016/2022) along which we systematically track the performance of Eurosceptic parties. Third, we complement these data with party results in the EU elections of 2014 and 2019, which fall into the two respective time periods and work as an additional yardstick for the evaluation of Eurosceptic parties’ performances. Updating more directly the work of Van Kessel et al. (2020), the paper adds to their analytical framework the factor represented by the impact of Brexit seven years after the referendum. It also sets out to re-construct the declining role of 'exit' in the narrative of the general elections held in the four selected countries in 2021-22, while addressing the stability of the Eurosceptic vote in the very same elections. Brexit has been a challenging issue with manifold implications for the European Union. Checking how it has impacted the political discourse, and the political power of Eurosceptic actors, remains a vital undertaking to the present day.