The paper deals with the lack of Transitional Justice (TJ) in Nicaragua after its latest civil war (1981-1990). It analyses the enabling conditions and effects of the policy of oblivion chosen by President Chamorro (1990-1997) and her successors.
Nicaragua is one of the few cases in which no TJ mechanisms have been applied after the end of the civil war. In comparison to other transitory and post-conflict states, no truth commission was established and no judicial prosecutions against former human rights violators were carried out. Neither did Nicaraguan governments carry out lustrations or implement reparations programs for the victims of past rights abuses.
Drawing on qualitative research the study finds that “classical” explanatory variables such as the mode of transition, the balance of power and the degree and extent of past human rights violations also played a significant role in determining Nicaragua’s strategy to (not) deal with the past. Moreover, the absence of internal and external pressure contributed to the policy of oblivion.
The decision to draw a line under the past and exclusively focus on the future has affected the Nicaraguan society in a number of ways. Most visibly it has allowed for a continuing polarization of perspectives on the civil war and the performance of the Sandinista government. Furthermore, it has stimulated the use of history by political elites in order to justify present-day interests. Another impact of the lack of TJ is the fragmentation of historical knowledge among people of the younger generations. Finally, impunity that also continued after 1990 has deepened public mistrust in Nicaragua’s justice system.
The case of Nicaragua illustrates the difficult task of weighing the short-term risk of political instability against potential negative long-term consequences that undermine democracy and social coexistence.
