Between coercion and persuasion: Explaining alternations in the EU readmission policy

The return of migrants staying irregularly in the EU or whose asylum requests have been rejected has been a top priority of the EU migration policy since its inception. Effective returns, however, cannot be enforced unilaterally but essentially depend on the collaboration of the (re)admitting country. As the latter have little to gain from such cooperation, the return rate has stayed low and effective return policies have remained at the top of the EU agenda until today. How has the EU tried to enlist third countries in migrant readmission, what explains changes in the EU's approach, and can one observe a learning process in EU readmission policy over time? This paper addresses these questions based on an original dataset of EU external migration policy instruments distinguishing "coercive" instruments based on issue-linkage and conditionality on the one hand and "soft" instrument geared at persuasion and socialization on the other. The dataset includes readmission provisions in all EU trade agreements signed since 1960 until 2022 (MITA dataset), formal readmission agreements, as well as legally non-binding instruments such as mobility partnerships, migration agendas, compacts, and Frontex working arrangements. Rather than documenting the development towards a coherent strategy the analysis discloses a somewhat erratic alternation between the use of coercive instruments and approaches based on persuasion. Instead of being informed by the exchanges and experiences with target countries we find that decision-makers have been primarily driven by political conjunctures within the EU.