Channeling unrest? Opposition coordination in authoritarian elections: Evidence from 2021 smart voting strategy in Russia

In electoral autocracies, opposition parties offer the best hope for regime change. Yet, anti-regime voters are often uncertain about the most credible alternative as the opposition is often divided, and autocrats possess the tools to coopt and repress anti-regime elites and voters. Using Alexei Navalny's smart vote campaign to coordinate voters around viable opposition candidates for the 2021 Duma elections, this article develops and tests a novel theory of anti-regime vote coordination in the absence of viable electoral coalitions. We show that the campaign improved opposition candidates' vote share but did not help them to win elections. Nevertheless, opposition candidates were electorally successful in regions where voters were highly discontent with the regime -as shown by using data on willingness to protest in support of Navalny shortly before elections. Yet, the smart voting campaign also helped the Kremlin to further hone its electoral fraud strategies. We find the Kremlin took votes away from opposition candidates recommended by the smart vote campaign, bolstered support for other opposition candidates, and left behind weak United Russia candidates.