Can Governments be Trusted? On the Archaeology of Post-Truth

The phenomenon of port-truth is widely regarded as being indicative of a breakdown in trust between the state and its citizens. Even in times of crisis, or perhaps especially in times of crisis, trust in central authority appears to be in short supply. Recently Covid-19 has been referred to as the first post-truth pandemic, exposing the chronic lack of trust between (some) citizens and the state. This paper argues that it is misleading to use the language of trust to illustrate the relationship between the state and the citizen, shedding a new light on the phenomenon of post-truth. Part 1 looks at the language of trust used by Hobbes and Locke in the social contract tradition. I will argue that contemporary political theory has uncritically (and wrongly) adopted the terminology of trust suggested by John Locke in the Second Treatise of Government to capture the relationship between the state and the individual in a social contract. Part 2 explores the concept of trust. I will defend the definition of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’ put forward by Russell Hardin. This definition exposes the limits of using the Lockean terminology of trust. While trust can explain the (horizontal) relationship between citizens, it cannot explain the (vertical) relationship between citizens and the state. Part 3 argues that if trust is ‘encapsulated interest’, as suggested in Part 2, it follows that it is wrong to frame post-truth within the logic of trust. Instead, we need to rethink the motivations of post-truth. I will suggest that post-truth is not about lack of trust, instead it is merely a manifestation of the excesses of the liberal politics of subjective rights, and how they can be manipulated by political leaders.