CPDA and cybersecurity policy: the case of US-Russian relations

This paper focuses on discourses of cybersecurity on the background of US-Russian relations and perspectives for global cybersecurity discourse. Currently, there are two competing points of view that each state adheres to in shaping security policy for cyberspace. Information security with a focus on content threats to society and the political regime is common in Russia, while cybersecurity denotes a more technological approach with a focus on protecting networks and infrastructures in the US. But since the 2016 US presidential elections, the discourse of cybersecurity has gained more «infosecurity» traits with «hacked elections». I chose CPDA because cybersecurity is what can’t be seen or touched, thus the knowledge about this field is constantly constructed while policy partly depends on cybersecurity discourses. Given the basic notion of the co-constitution of agents and structures in the constructivist approach, there are two research questions. First, how structure (dynamics in bilateral relations) affects actors? In other words, does the interaction between the USA and Russia in cyberspace (and other fields) affect the articulation of their cybersecurity discourses? Will an agent revise his discourse and, eventually, cybersecurity policy under the influence of the bilateral structure? However, the process could go vice versa and bilateral relations could be defined by adherence to cybersecurity policies formulated according to the discourse in place. Some CDA studies in IR were criticized for selecting only one side for analysis (either agents or structures) and overlooking other explanatory factors of policy change. For this reason, I’ll also look into the second RQ: how agents affect the structure, but for this time the level of structure will go up from bilateral relations to international negotiating places, namely UN GGE and OEWG. In the context of my research, it is: how do cybersecurity discourses of the USA and Russia affect the results of cyber norms negotiations? What are the sensitive threats and concerns for both states that ultimately hinder global consensus on cybersecurity? At this stage, agents use structure to reinforce their discourse through the support of like-minded states. The main hypothesis is that there will be progress in cybersecurity (both on bilateral and international levels of structures) once the discourses of actors will be aligned, so the perception of cyber threats becomes similar. It is in the interests of any agent to come first and impose his cybersecurity discourse convincing others that it correctly reflects reality. When the values and perceptions of cyber threats coincide, it is easier to make concessions and work out joint solutions for cybersecurity policy. To test this hypothesis I use the framework of Holszcheiter (2013) where she proposed two levels of analysis (micro-agents and macro-structure) and two power–discourse relationships (deliberative and productive). Preliminary findings show that «imposition» of discourse can be both deliberative and productive, depending on the level of structure. This paper is a research-in-progress.