Electoral Integrity in the Age of Disinformation: Bridging the Gaps in the Research on Election Disinformation and Electoral Integrity

A broad range of actors, including politicians, foreign states, bots, and trolls, disseminate election disinformation on social media, which can decrease voter turnout, diminish trust in election results and ultimately undermine public confidence in the overall democratic process. Despite increasing concerns, the impact of disinformation on electoral integrity has not been thoroughly explored. Apart from a few studies focusing on the effects of cyber threats (Garnett & James, 2020; Garnett & Pal, 2022; Judge & Korhani, 2020), there has been limited focus on election disinformation in the electoral integrity literature. The objective of this paper is to analyse and bridge key gaps in the research on election disinformation and electoral integrity. To achieve this, it will synthesise insights from the disinformation studies and electoral integrity literature, drawing on empirical evidence from the former and theoretical frameworks from the latter. This paper will provide recommendations on addressing these gaps to advance our understanding of the challenges facing democracy today. The first gap is that the impact of election disinformation has not been fully incorporated into statistical analyses in the electoral integrity literature. Much research has focused on the impact on electoral integrity of electoral management bodies, the judiciary, the media, civil society, and international and domestic monitoring organisations (Asunka et al., 2019; Birch & Van Ham, 2017; Hyde & Marinov, 2014). The disinformation ecosystem has not been considered a factor affecting electoral integrity, despite the relevant data being available. A widely used dataset, the V-Dem, for example, includes indices on coordinated information operations, including the dissemination of false information by governments, foreign governments, and parties. Such indices can be a good starting point to analyse the impact of disinformation on electoral integrity. Another gap is that the circulation of disinformation by politicians has not been included in the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler, 2002). Empirical findings suggest that domestic politicians are now believed to be more active than foreign actors in spreading disinformation (Benkler et al., 2020; Warren, 2020). Arguably, therefore, the spread of disinformation should be included in the menu of manipulation employed by politicians. The conceptual framework from electoral manipulation theory can guide researchers to explain the rationale behind politicians’ strategies in disseminating false claims. In addition, despite the wealth of research on election monitoring, social media monitoring (SMM) remains a significant gap in the literature. Until recently, monitoring activities were conducted by domestic and international organisations using traditional methods, such as monitoring polling stations. However, as these methods are inadequate in detecting and countering disinformation, monitoring organisations have begun SMM. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the impact of SMM on electoral integrity. Moreover, SMM companies (e.g. BrandWatch, which the EU has employed to track Russian influence (Schmuziger Goldzweig et al., 2019, p. 15)) remain among the key players yet to have been fully recognised in the literature. Studies should examine the impact of these actors on electoral integrity.