Mobilisation for and against Liberal Democracy in Central Europe

Understanding the dynamics of mobilisation for and against liberal democracy is crucial in analysing democratic backsliding (Greskovits, 2020; Stanley, 2019). In Central Europe, electoral and non-electoral participation increased as populists rose to power, yet, democracy declined - hinting towards a complex relationship between populism in power and societal mobilisation (Guasti, 2020). Drawing on Bernhard’s typology (2020) and unique quasi-experimental data from the 2023 Czech presidential election, this paper explores societal mobilisation for and against liberal democracy. The paper is structured as follows; the first part builds a conceptual framework on the literature on the relationship between populism, democracy, and civil society. Second, using unique data from two surveys conducted before and after the Czech 2023 presidential election, the paper explores drivers of mobilisation for and against liberal democracy. Third, building on the findings from the Czech case and using V-DEM data, two possible paths for Central European democracy will be explored – democratic decay and democratic resilience. In the democratic decay scenario, the rise and dominance of pro-autocratic mobilisation can be observed. An uncivil society is stronger than a civil society by building mutually beneficial ties with the ruling populist parties (Guasti & Bustikova, 2023). Institutionalised pro-liberal democracy civil society is suppressed, faces repression or has been co-opted by the ruling populists (cf. Greskovits 2020). In the democratic resilience scenario, institutionalised and firewall civil society mobilises to defend liberal democracy. Together they are stronger than uncivil society and provide an effective channel of diagonal accountability to prevent democratic backsliding.