Not one without the other: direct democracy and human rights

By the end of the twentieth century, democracy had become the fundamental political system in the world: this statement is true even if we know that the majority of humanity lives under non-democratic rule, and that the democratic system has been subject to many challenges, conflicts, and erosions since its generalization at the end of the second World War. Yet, all polities want to appear democratic, and as a consequence, elections and other popular actions matter not only in democracies, but have even entered the toolbox of autocracies. In addition to the institutionalization of democracy, another dominant political trend at the turn of the millennium is the decline of social confidence in representative institutions, the emergence of the shortcomings of liberal democracy due to its elitist nature, and the questioning of liberal democracy as the only possible political system. The rise of populism, whether as the advance of far-right parties, or as participatory initiatives and movement politics to compensate for the shortcomings of liberal representative democracy, or as a political response to technocratic-elitist neoliberal governance, is the most popular and most discussed topic in contemporary social science. One of the 'symptoms' of the spread of populism and the crisis of liberal democracy is the increasing use of referendums and the rise of initiatives to institutionalize direct citizen participation in political decision-making. In the light of this, it is not surprising that an increasing number of studies and books are once again dealing with the political consequences (dangers) of referendums and direct democracy, and their compatibility with liberal democracy. Usually, they conclude that referendums, if they are needed at all, should be severely limited, either through international conventions or through national constitutions, thus minimizing the risk they pose to effective governance, informed decision-making, and the rule of law and human rights (all of them as fundaments of liberal democracy). The aim of this paper is to show why and in what direction it would be necessary to rethink the relationship between direct democracy and human rights. Instead of the dominant approach in the literature, which treats direct democracy and human rights as opposing institutions, and suggests that the former must therefore be limited for securing the latter, this paper argues that direct democracy is an integral part of our right to political participation, and therefore it is not its limitation that should be discussed, but the guarantees of exercising this right as a form of democracy. In other words, we could consider referendum as a kind of political participation, and not as a constrain on representative government. Accordingly, the paper is divided into three main sections: the first section provides a critical overview of the most common criticisms of direct democracy; the second section discusses the relationship between democracy and human rights; and finally, it argues why a new, wider approach of democracy (including self-evidently direct and indirect elements) would strengthen liberal democracy.