When Two Self-Regulatory Regimes meet… The case of German Nuclear Power Policy

Self-regulation is usually considered from the perspective of the political system. It focuses on structrual preconditions, how legitimacy is generated, the role of the (regulatory) state or when the political system has to intervene anyway. This paper deviates from this tradition as it focuses on the organisational and institutional features of self-regulatory regimes beyond the political system. It assumes that the self-regulatory regime must develop an institutional framework within the system that is self-regulating. It also assumes that self-regulation should be analysed in the context of a broader regime perspective in which self-regulation and traditional regulation coexist and are patterned (in ways suggested, for example, by Robert Baggott (e.g. 1989)). To shed light on these two assumptions, this paper analyses the emergence and development of German nuclear policy as a combination of two self-regulatory regimes (reactor development and radiation protection). These regimes function through independent actors and procedures and develop intermediary arenas; the overall setting is described as regulatory network. Preliminary findings are that the self-regulatory regimes are initially decoupled and coexist undisturbed (1955 - late 1960s). The commercial use of nuclear power from the mid-1960s onwards requires an increasingly formalised traditional regime to coordinate the self-regulatory regimes, in particular to resolve inherent conflicts. When self-regulation fails to provide security and development, conflict management requires not only traditional regulations but also new actors and arenas. Conflict management rearranges the self-regulatory regimes, legal actors and social movements gain influence. Nevertheless, at its core, German nuclear policy is self-regulatory. Those preliminary findings could serve as a basis for further research into the use of and limits to self-regulation.