Democratic Backsliding and Dominating Regulatory Agencies: Evidence from Turkey and Brazil

Abstract: The recent rise of populism and the authoritarian turn around the world has generated a debate on its implications for public administration. In this context, populist leaders target autonomous regulatory agencies for implementation of their political agendas. While we know that there are various mechanisms of domination (Bauer and Becker 2020, Bauer et al. 2021), comparative studies could still shed light on how these mechanisms play out in different contexts. More importantly, an emphasis on political coalitions is necessary because these leaders come to power and remain in power by serving the interests of the political coalition on which they rely. Furthermore, political coalitions are critical in determining which strategies are used, and thereby mechanisms of domination. In this paper, we examine and compare the Turkish and Brazilian contexts. In doing so, our aim is to highlight the mechanisms and strategies Erdogan and Bolsanaro employ to dominate autonomous regulatory agencies, which are determined by political coalitions. In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s coalition that involves the agro-business and military is critical in driving domination of regulatory agencies and militarisation of regulatory agencies. In Turkey, the military is sidelined, but the interests of Erdogan’s coalition members (faith-based groups and SMEs) are implemented through appointment of party loyalists and politicisation of regulatory policy issues. As such, the paper has two main contributions: It discusses the variety of strategies and mechanisms, and points to the role of political coalitions in the domination of regulatory agencies