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How do regulatory agencies gain their reputation? A q-sort analysis how employees of independent regulatory agencies view the construction of their reputation by others

Civil Society
Executives
Institutions
Public Administration
Regulation
Business
Empirical
Lauren Fahy
University of Utrecht
Lauren Fahy
University of Utrecht
erik hans klijn
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Judith van Erp
University of Utrecht

Abstract

While traditionally envisioned as insular and technocratic, research shows today’s independent regulatory agency plays a more public and political role. Regulatory agencies act not just to make technically correct decisions, but decisions which will protect their reputation with stakeholder audiences. To explain and predict how regulators will act, we need a better understanding of how regulators think about their reputation. To that end, scholarship has begun to move from proving that agencies have reputational motives behind their actions toward building comprehensive theory on what reputational threats and incentives regulators face (e.g. Busuioc and Rimkute 2020; Boon, Salmonsen, and Verhoest 2019). However, empirical research about how regulators view reputation acquisition is still limited. This study aims to address this gap, and therefore contribute to this burgeoning body of theory, by asking: in the opinion of their employees, how do regulatory agencies gain their reputation? Using Q methodology, we explored the opinions of 205 regulatory employees from eight Dutch agencies. Results reveal five ‘profiles’ of opinions among employees as to how agencies acquire reputation. Most dominant are that reputation is primarily acquired through good performance, effective communications and media management, and quality customer service. However, there is variation between respondents. Employing agency, job function, and degree of contact with citizens and regulatees seem to influence employees' opinions on reputation acquisition. This study makes a sizeable contribution to theory. To date, theory on reputation acquisition in the public sector has been relatively silo-ed and empirically under-tested. This study provides novel empirical evidence which holistically evaluates theory. Results suggest regulator reputation acquisition functions through an interplay of agential and institutionals factors, and provides qualitative insights into these mechanisms (Boon 2022). In so doing, the study lays analytical groundwork to develop models of reputation acquisition similar to those found in corporate reputation theory.