What kind of regulatory agency reputation most motivates compliance with regulation? A conjoint experiment with regulatees

While promising, research evaluating bureaucratic reputation theory about the relationship between various kinds of regulator reputation and compliance is still limited. Only a few studies have sought to test the effect of regulator reputation on compliance behaviour or motivation. None, to the authors’ knowledge, have sought to systematically study the effects of the different kinds of reputation theory describes on compliance motivation among regulatees. This study aims to help to address this empirical and theoretical gap by asking: what kind of regulatory agency reputation most motivates compliance with regulation? To examine this question, we will conduct a conjoint survey experiment with regulatees in the Netherlands ([n = est. 260-400]) from several economic sectors. In the experiment, respondents will be presented a vignette which presents them with a compliance dilemma: two regulators have conflicting rules about the same situation. The reputational characteristics of each regulator are randomized. The respondent must choose with which regulator to comply.