Levelling the Playing Field? Coopting third country regulators for EU regulatory extension

The EU’s trade relationship with third countries tests its influence on States themselves, regulators and firms. A key issue facing the EU is how to manage regulatory divergence and maintain its competitiveness in the absence of globally harmonised standards. EU regulatory extension can occur through different modes, which may interact: via the ‘Brussels effect’ through the market, through legislation or intergovernmental agreements, and/or through technocratic engagement between regulators. Drawing from the law and political science literature on the EU as a global regulator, regulatory networks, and integration without membership, this paper explores how, in the absence of substantive harmonisation, the EU coopts third country regulators through instruments for functionalist cooperation to manage regulatory divergence. It argues that the EU lays the foundation for this cooperation through exporting in trade agreements EU principles such as equivalence, transparency, and requirements for independent regulators. More specifically, in some areas it looks to mirror internal and external provisions on cooperation.