Religious actors supporting secular parties in post-2011 Egypt
Government
Party Members
Party Systems
Abstract
The aborted Egyptian transition of 2011-2013 was electorally dominated by the forces of political Islam. Nevertheless, some religious institutions backed secular parties and candidates during the 2011 and 2012 elections. Among them, the Orthodox Christian Church, but also some Sufi orders. Indeed, during the free and fair parliamentary elections of 2011, grassroots Christian organizations, but also religious institutions mobilized at the local level to support the Free Egyptian party, a liberal movement created by a Christian businessman, Naguib Sawiris. It is not surprising that a religious minority such as Christians in Egypt favors secularization of the state, and such phenomena has been observed in contemporary Europe as well. Conversely, Sufi orders belong to Sunni Islam, majoritarian in Egypt. Some of them nevertheless created political parties in 2011, which participated in the Parliamentary elections, defending a secular programme. One of them, the Voice of Revolution party, entered into a coalition with the Free Egyptian party.
In order to understand these post-revolutionary positions, one should consider the contemporary history of relationship between the Egyptian state and the religious institutions. The building of the a modern state, under the dynasty of Muhamad Ali and his successors, constituted a progress for the status of the Copts. Considered as dhimmis subjected to a jizya tax under the Ottoman empire, they became Egyptian citizens, legally equal to their fellow Muslim citizens. Early 20th century witnessed a rising challenging of the religious hierarchy by the Coptic laity, culminating in the invasion of the patriarchal residence by activists in July 1954. But at that time, the new Republican regime was looking for a stable interlocutor to represent the Coptic minority. This led to a strengthening of the pope and the religious hierarchy in exchange for their support to the regime. Troubled during the last years of President Sadat’s rule, the relationship between the state and the Church remained stable under Mubarak (1981-2011). Nevertheless, confessional incidents were on the rise since the 1990s, and the bombing of a church in Alexandria on January 1st 2011 constituted one of the immediate cause of the January 25th revolution. This context contributes to explain the attitude of Christian institution during the aborted transition.
Sufi orders have been progressively marginalized by the modern state, starting in the 19th century. Since the beginnings of the Republic in the 1950s, Sufi orders have been organized by the state, under the tutelage of a Supreme Council, making them a part of the official institutions of Islam. Threatened by the rise of political Islam, these institutions are prone to defend the secular state which guarantees their existence. The Sufi officials and most of the 74 officially recognized Sufi orders remained apolitical during the aborted transition. Only a minority of them tried to enter into politics, in order to counterbalance the influence of political Islam, but also in an attempt to regain some autonomy vis-à-vis the state.