Between Playing Hardball and Accommodating Generously? The European Union’s Terms of Enlargement

Do norms impact state action, or are they purely instrumental and subordinate to material interests? I approach this long-standing International Relations debate concerning the influence of norms by analysing the European Union’s (EU) terms of enlargement. When enlargement is on the agenda, the EU member states are torn between minimizing the financial implications of enlargement and fulfilling their normative obligations to support new members with whom they share a common identity. Historically, the EU has demonstrated ambivalence to new members by either discriminating them from membership benefits or exempting them from obligations in their initial years of membership. I claim that understanding the determinants of the EU’s enlargement terms requires bridging the prevalent divide between rational and normative institutionalism in European Studies. By combining elements from both institutionalisms, I argue that states’ material interests and normative principles are equally influential throughout the negotiations. Therefore, I expect the terms of enlargement to be a painstakingly negotiated compromise that balances the material and normative interests of all actors involved, with trade-offs concerning the extent, scope and duration of differentiation clauses. I test this integrative theoretical approach by examining the terms of enlargement for the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) integration into the European Community (EC), for which the dilemma between material interests and normative principles was particularly pronounced. The mixed-methods analysis reveals an exceptionally high number of differentiation clauses with, however, short duration and discrimination in the area of the structural funds indicating rather strict enlargement terms for East Germany. The findings are not only theoretically insightful but also speak to current enlargement candidates, for which the tension between material and normative interests is similar.