Democratic experience matters twice: the cross-national and longitudinal effect of democracy on winner-loser gaps in political trust

The enduring and consistent cross-national differences in political trust, despite significant within-country variations, have historically been addressed through the lens of cultural determinism inspired by the traditional culturalist model (Almond and Verba, 1963; Citrin, 1975; Easton, 1965, 1975; Lerner, 1958; Uslaner, 2002). However, with the ascendancy of the rational-culturalist paradigm emphasizing the endogeneity and greater volatility of political attitudes (Lane, 1992; Letki & Evans, 2005; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Pateman, 1971; Torcal & Magalhaes, 2010; Whitefield & Evans, 1999), scholars shifted their focus to probing short-term variations in political trust (Kenworthy and Owens, 2011; Offe, 2006; Zmerli and Newton, 2011). Despite numerous significant contributions highlighting the importance of the three "p factors" (performance, process, and probity) in explaining time variation in political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Citrin and Stoker 2018), none have adequately explained enduring cross-national differences (Devine & Valgarðsson 2023). In this context, we propose a novel perspective in this paper, suggesting that the enduring effects of winners and losers in political systems may not diminish with increasing democratic experiences in new democracies. Instead, we hypothesize that these lasting effects may be influenced by the imprint left by preceding non-democratic experiences. In countries without a democratic tradition, individuals may be less inclined to trust that an out-party will not misuse power to the detriment of the in-party. Consequently, the longer the preceding non-democratic experience, the less likely citizens would trust institutions resulting from an electoral defeat. This perspective posits winning as a long-term phenomenon extending beyond initial disappointment, potentially explaining cross-national low levels of political trust. Additionally, the effect of progressive democratic deterioration on losers may be stronger, showing a more negative impact on political trust, particularly among losers in countries with longer non-democratic traditions. Employing an item-harmonized scale of political trust, our longitudinal cross-regional study in Europe and Latin America seeks to address two fundamental questions: What explains consistent cross-national differences in political trust despite remarkable within-country variations over time? Is the factor accounting for these cross-national differences also responsible for increasing within-country variations in political trust? In this paper, we argue in favor of the importance of winner/loser reactions as the principal mechanism behind both cross-national differences in overall levels and within-country variations in trust in institutions of democratic representation.