The bureaucratic politics of environmental governance networks

In this paper, I study how the politicisation and instability of public bureaucracies influence polycentric systems’ performance, focusing on developing countries transitioning to new governance structures. By combining complex systems theories with bureaucratic politics literature, I study how bureaucratic politics shapes the adaptative and learning capacity of environmental governance networks. I hypothesise that higher levels of public sector politicisation can positively (negatively) impact the emergence of polycentric networks in contexts of low (high) political competition. In turn, increased staff turnover in more politicised and less professional bureaucracies makes governance networks less sustainable and more vulnerable to electoral cycles. Empirically, I fit Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models to the networks of environmental collaborative agreements in Colombia between 2017 and 2022. Leveraging the 2019 regional elections, I analyse the effect of government changes on the emergence and evolution of ties among agencies with varying levels of politicisation and professionalisation. This research sheds light on the relationship between bureaucratic politics and environmental governance, offering insights to reimagine the public sector reforms required to capture the benefits of polycentric modes of environmental governance.