Internalism and Integrationism in Global Justice Theory

In recent decades, global political theory has experienced a shift from the abstract to the concrete. Where once the focus lay on foundational theories concerning the nature, grounds and scope of justice, a growing number of theorists have turned their attention to various applied policy areas in the global realm. Relatively detached, yet empirically sophisticated debates have emerged around topics such as international trade, finance, climate change, migration, or human rights. With this shift, an important methodological question is brought to the fore: how, if at all, do normative theories within a given area or domain relate to wider considerations of justice? On one possible view, these theories are best developed in relative isolation, reflecting the particularities of the domain to which they apply. On an alternative view, they should be developed in conjunction with one another, so that the demands of justice in trade, for example, are linked to other normative concerns surrounding the environment, migration, or human rights. While this does not rule out focusing on specific policy areas to grasp the moral issues at their base, it presupposes a general background theory that places domain-specific considerations within a holistic view of what justice, in a larger sense, demands. Following Simon Caney, this latter view is typically referred to as ‘integrationism.’ Developed initially in the context of climate justice, it has also been invoked in domains such as international trade, natural resources, or immigration. As a method of theory-building, its attractions are clear: by taking a broader view of justice, it promises to avoid the myopic (and therefore ostensibly implausible) principles of domain-focused theorising. My aims in this paper are twofold. The first is to examine the arguments for integrationism to highlight their limitations. As I show, these arguments do not support some of the more demanding interpretations of the approach. In particular, they do not provide us with reasons to accept the idea that all domains of justice must be integrated, or that benefits and burdens across all domains form part of an ‘overall package’ on which judgments of justice must focus. My second aim is to contrast integrationism with a pluralist account of global justice in which various domains are each governed by ‘internal’ principles that arise within them and in virtue of their particularities. I defend the coherence of such an account and outline different versions and uses of the internalist method. While for some purposes, internalist principles can take account of seemingly external moral considerations, I also show that theories of justice that exclude these considerations can help us specify normative demands at the level of ideal theory. As such, the paper contributes to broader methodological debates in political philosophy, and helps illuminate what is at stake in alternative approaches found in the recent literature on global justice.