Protesting Together

Political protests are almost always collective endeavours; the success of a protest we engage in relies in large part on the participation of others. Protesting together involves making some shared claim or demand. But can the justification of a protest be affected by other political claims espoused by some of those participating in it? And do we have a duty not to protest alongside those who have deeply objectionable beliefs? In this paper I provide an analysis of these cases. I suggest both that the deeply objectionable beliefs of others can generate duties on us not to protest alongside them, and that there are ways in which we can relate to others in protest which (at least in some cases) circumvent these duties. My argument focusses on two aspects of protest which can alter the ways in which protestors relate to the beliefs of those alongside whom they protest. The first of these is the nature of the relationship between protestors. When we are shared members of an organisation, we have a thicker connection than merely jointly endorsing some claim; rather, I argue that we also (in some circumstances) endorse the views and aims of the group as a whole, and may each reasonably be held responsible for some of the acts of that organisation. When others in that group have reprehensible beliefs, and these are tolerated by that group, actions undertaken by that group can reasonably be taken to implicitly advocate that claim. Of course, we often protest alongside people with whom we do not constitute any group agent. When these collectivities are sufficiently organised, some agents might be taken to implicitly endorse some other claims endorsed or tolerated by the collective. Other relationships generate different kinds of connections between protestors which do not involve a risk of broader endorsement. I argue that when we protest in solidarity, we need not directly endorse the explicit claims made by the primary protesting group; rather, our protest can be based on their broader mistreatment or oppression, or aimed at bringing their complaints into the public eye. Nor do we necessarily develop a thicker relationship with the primary protesting group, such that we can reasonably be understood to endorse other claims held by that group (or, conversely, to endorse claims held by those protesting in support of our own claims). We can permissibly protest in solidarity with those who hold reprehensible views, in these circumstances. The second aspect of protest I focus on is the claims themselves. I argue that outside of straightforward ‘rejection’ cases of protest, political claims made by others which go beyond those central to the protest can be relevant to the permissibility of protesting alongside those others. We have duties not to protest with certain others when doing so would indirectly amplify other hateful views they hold, or when doing so would prevent us from effectively engaging in counterspeech against hateful claims.