The logic of bottom-up accountability: Experimental evidence from civil society leaders in Peru

Governments in many countries have institutional mechanisms for citizens to report problems with government services, suspicions of corruption, or experiences of abuses. Such mechanisms, often at ombudsman offices, public prosecutors, comptroller offices, or anti-corruption agencies, are in many cases digital and anonymous and therefore have high ease of use. Usage varies, however, and in many settings is low. This paper examines underlying causes of willingness or reluctance to use such mechanisms and contributes to the broader understanding of what conditions shape societal accountability actions. It assesses whether particularism and favoritism in government operations may paradoxically undermine citizens’ willingness to exercise accountability. The analyses use original data from a two-wave survey of civil society leaders in Peru. The first survey contains an information experiment to examine whether increased knowledge affects willingness to use such mechanisms. Some respondents also receive information about particularism in local government to assess whether this depresses willingness to take accountability action. A second treatment consists of a one-hour training workshop conducted by Proética (TI Peru); a second survey assesses effects on actual behavior.