Executive Power Dynamics in Central Europe: Analysing Presidential Influence on Ministerial Appointments

This paper explores conflicts over ministerial appointments in Central European countries with a dual executive (Blondel 1992), specifically focusing on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. In these nations, the executive power is shared between the prime minister-led cabinet and the president. While the president's role is not purely symbolic, their executive powers are generally considered weaker than that of the cabinet. The dual executive with two democratically legitimized actors creates potential for disagreements and disputes, the theme commonly conceptualized as intra-executive conflicts, understood as "political confrontation between president and prime minister over the control of the executive branch of government" (Protsyk 2006: 219; see also Protsyk 2005: 138; Sedelius 2006: 66; Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013: 110 and 113; Yan 2021: 287). Examining the period from the 1990s until the present day, including recent instances, such as the 2023 Slovak elections and the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections, where presidents blocked ministerial candidates, we question whether these cases challenge the prevailing notion that presidents in systems with predominantly strong cabinets play a formal (passive) role in government formation. Our inquiry concerns three main questions: Do presidents have veto power over ministerial nominations? Under what conditions are presidents more likely to block such appointments? How do presidents justify their interventions? The paper begins with a theoretical exploration of intra-executive conflicts, drawing on relevant research to establish a theoretical framework. We also derive hypotheses regarding the conditions under which presidents are inclined to impede ministerial appointments. Additionally, we examine reasons presidents cite to justify such actions, drawing on existing research on ministerial appointments. The subsequent sections delve into a detailed analysis of constitutional provisions in the four Central European countries, relying on constitutional experts' interpretations due to the brevity of respective constitutional provisions. We also consider decisions from constitutional courts where applicable. The paper then provides an overview of cases where presidents attempted to block ministerial nominations, with a focus on successful attempts. We scrutinize the reasons presidents provided for their interventions and analyse the conditions under which these attempts occurred. The preliminary results show a striking variation in disputes over ministerial appointments across the four countries. In contrast to Hungary and Poland, presidents in the Czech Republic and Slovakia repeatedly and successfully vetoed ministerial appointments. The paper addresses this variation as well.