Logical fallacies in democratic theory or how dialectical logic may help

In my contribution I address one source of fallacies in democratic theory, whose roots are more fundamental than the critique that democratic theory is both Western-centred and favours the concept of liberal democracy, albeit closely connected to them. It is based on the inherent logic applied in the discussion of democracy and social sciences as a whole. The problem can be described as the so-called logic of identity, which is fundamental to western thought since Aristotle. I will argue that by applying dialectical logic there is the possibility of avoiding particular fallacies. Further I will show, that the critique does not only apply to normative reasoning, but non-normative as well. Therefore, I will first elaborate on the critique of the logic of identity, the most sophisticated form of which can be found in the work of Henri Lefèbvre. For the aim of the paper, the critique can be summarized that the logic of identity fails to grasp change, temporality, and perspectivity. Using this critique, I will show that the question 'What is a democracy?' and its accompanying presuppositions, which led to the current state of democratic theory, are rooted in this. At least they suppose that there is a substantial definition of democracy that is applicable. But there is already the problem, that it is not clear, if democracy is a societal phenomenon or political regime – or both? This is problematic as any possible answer fails to include future change, or is historically applicable. The latter will be illustrated by the question if a colonial power with colonies can be a democracy. Thirdly in the light of the long lasting debate about democracy in the west, the concept is designated as essentially contested. I will show, that this is merely a precarious solution, as it remains within the logic of identity, that additionally not only excludes non-western contributions arbitrarily but is historically arbitrary as well. Secondly, in order to advance, we have to move beyond the logic of identity. We need a different way of reasoning, which can be found in dialectical logic, first introduced in western thought by G. W. F. Hegel and later elaborated by Adorno and Lefebvre. Dialectical logic is constantly distorted and mutilated to the three terms Thesis – Antitheses – Syntheses. As dialectical logic is complex and multifaceted I will focus on its solutions to the elaborated critique. They can be accumulated to the fact, that all our reasoning is ‘historical’ rooted, i.e. we argue from a distinct geographical, political and temporal position. By taking this seriously I will show, how we can advance in democratic theory, by firstly omitting the universalisation of our particular position and secondly transforming our question from a substantial one (such as "what is democracy?") to one that seeks the law of motion (Bewegungsgesetz) of democracy.