The bureaucratic politics of impact assessment in the European Commission

Research in the bureaucratic politics tradition notes that the European Commission is not a unitary actor, and that its individual directorates-general (DGs) each have their own agendas, preferences and policy constituencies, as well as varying degrees of power and resource. Studies of preference aggregation within the Commission teach us a lot about the interaction between DGs during the agenda-setting process. However, most of them imply that this ‘internal politics’ is resolved before the ostensibly technocratic process of impact assessment begins. Arguing that impact assessment is, in fact, a political enterprise and part of the agenda-setting process, this paper explores the role of individual DGs in the drafting of impact assessment reports. It studies a specific case of non-decision making within an impact assessment report – the revision of the EU’s audiovisual media services directive – and demonstrates how the substantive preferences of different DGs continued to be asserted throughout the process of report drafting, and eventually shaped policy output. The paper utilises a process tracing methodology, supported by access to document requests that provide data not previously in the public domain. Comparing three versions of the impact assessment report, and drawing on correspondence between DGs and external stakeholders, we trace the disappearance from the agenda of provisions on the advertising of alcohol to children. Our analysis demonstrates the myriad points during the report drafting process at which DGs and external actors could influence the process and, as such, challenges the understanding of impact assessment as a technocratic, apolitical tool of bureaucracy. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of this for the evidence-based nature of impact assessment in the EU.