Kant, Active Citizenship and Epistocracy

Epistocratic (or rule-of-the-wisest) alternatives to electoral democracy have recently gained traction in the field of democratic theory, based on the claims that some citizens lack competency to vote well and that strict political inclusion thus produces undesirable results. Despite being a fierce defender of human dignity, freedom as self-governance and independence from the constraining choice of others, Immanuel Kant rejected universal turnout and displayed heavy criticism against democracy. This paper explores the plausibility that Kant’s restriction of the right to vote and his distinction between active and passive citizens were grounded on such epistocratic belief. The first section of this paper presents Kant’s views regarding voting rights and offers a review of three interpretation which can be qualified as "epistocratic". The second section offers historical context which allows to make sense of the criteria used by Kant to justify its restriction of the right to vote. I focus on how servitude was conceived in Early modern Europe and on how it was associated with lack of free-will. Moreover, I use historical examples to argue that the status of (unfree) servant conflicted with the definition of the (free) political subject (i.e. the citizen). The third and final section apply this reading to Kant's writing, allowing to explain his restriction of the right to vote without relying directly on concerns for individual comptency. I conclude by discussing the contemporary relevance of this interpretation, notably on the debate regarding the value of democracy and political participation.