Kant, Active Citizenship and Epistocracy

Epistocratic (or rule-of-the-wisest) alternatives to electoral democracy have recently gained traction in the field of democratic theory, based on the claims that some citizens lack competency to vote well and that strict political inclusion thus produces undesirable results. Despite being a fierce defender of human dignity, freedom as self-governance and independence from the constraining choice of others, Immanuel Kant rejected universal turnout and displayed heavy criticism against democracy. This paper explores the plausibility that Kant’s restriction of the right to vote and his distinction between active and passive citizens were grounded on such epistocratic belief. The first section of this paper presents Kant’s views regarding voting rights and offers a review of the literature attempting to make sense of his defense of restricted voting. I do so by distinguishing between arguments which can be qualified as “epistocratic” and those who cannot. The second section offers historical context which allows to make sense of the criteria used by Kant to justify its restriction of the right to vote. Moreover, I present a novel interpretation of his defense of restricted votings rights which mobilize both historical evidence regarding the perception of servitude at the time of his writings and Kant's conception of the original contract. The third and final section discuss contemporary relevance of this interpretation, notably in regard to the debate regarding the value of democracy and political participation.