A large number of scholars have studied cabinet survival in parliamentary democracies, aiming to explain why some cabinets last longer than others. However, only few authors have taken into account the fact that government formation can influence cabinet duration (see e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996). The aim of this paper is to provide a first analysis of how portfolio allocation influences cabinet duration. The basic idea is that cabinets are likely to last longer when the parties in the government are “satisfied” with the allocation of portfolios. We expect that where and when portfolio saliency is an important factor in the qualitative allocation of portfolios, the relatively high level of mutual satisfaction amongst partners regarding their policy payoffs could lead to more durable, less conflict-ridden coalitions. We evaluate several hypotheses about the role of portfolio allocation when predicting cabinet survival using an event history model applied to a new data set comprised of the post-war cabinets in the Western European parliamentary democracies. The results show that cabinets where the parties have received a high share of portfolios that are salient to them are likely to last longer, i.e. they are less likely to be terminated by early elections or cabinet replacement.
