The international behavior of EU regulatory agencies: cooperation with candidate countries

In recent years, the process of enlargement of the European Union (EU) has become increasingly difficult, with on the first hand member states not necessarily having the capacity and political will to integrate new countries, and on the other hand candidate countries encountering great difficulty in adopting the European acquis. EU regulatory governance is therefore being called into question in the region. Against this backdrop, EU agencies have emerged as an important new player in meeting this challenge. They enable direct interaction between European regulatory players and their counterparts in the candidate countries. However, little is known about the international behavior of EU regulatory agencies, and the divergences that may exist between their behavior and the preferences of other EU institutions. Indeed, EU regulatory agencies are utility-maximizing actors, and their preferences can diverge sharply from the will of the EU's central institutions. This article examines these dynamics and explores the behavior of EU agencies on the international stage, focusing on the de facto participation of candidate countries in EU agencies. Using four case studies representing the food safety, drug surveillance, migration and energy sectors, I explore the de facto participation of candidate countries in EU agencies and the factors that influence this participation. Based on these case studies, I argue that the behavior of EU regulatory agencies in their cooperation with candidate countries tends to reflect functionalist pressures, with EU agencies favoring their own needs over the preferences of EU central institutions. Furthermore, I argue that participation in EU agencies tends to strengthen technical cooperation between EU agencies and candidate countries, and to reinforce the EU's regulatory influence over the region.