Existing studies of legislative oversight of intelligence agencies have tended to focus on the institutional frameworks for oversight and in particular the form, mandate, membership, resources and access of intelligence oversight committees. This paper draws upon data from an on-going research project on parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services in the United Kingdom which looks more broadly at legislative scrutiny of intelligence beyond the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee and suggests that alternative variables in determining the effectiveness of legislative oversight are the extent of interest and expertise in intelligence within legislative bodies. The paper considers the problems of assessing or measuring parliamentary interest and expertise in intelligence and the utility of data collected using a range of methods including qualitative interviews with parliamentarians, quantitative analysis of parliamentary questions and Early Day Motions, and content analysis of parliamentary debates on intelligence. It focuses on issues relating to identifying and categorising intelligence issues within parliamentary business, the relative merits of measuring and assessing the extent and nature of parliamentary interest and expertise and problems of access, recording and presenting data. Finally, the paper offers some consideration of the potential impact of legislative interest and expertise on the effective operation of institutional structures for legislative scrutiny of intelligence.
