How ethnic diversity and geopolitical vulnerability can make democracies more resilient to backsliding: Lessons from the Baltic States

Why is there no democratic backsliding in the Baltic States, but rather in Hungary and, until recently, in Poland? The Baltic countries, with their large ethnic (Russian-speaking) minorities, geopolitical vulnerability and fragmented and chaotic party systems, would have been much better candidates for democratic backsliding than monoethnic Hungary and Poland, with relatively well-ordered party politics, also better shielded from the Russian threat (especially Hungary). The proposed paper argues that ethnic diversity and geopolitical vulnerability have turned rather into blessings, not curses, helping democratic resilience (at least while considering the Baltic experience). Because both factors have been, until recently, underexplored in the literature on democratic backsliding, the paper seeks to make an important contribution to the current section in which identities, identity politics and ongoing crises (e.g. the war in Ukraine) serve as the key topics. In the classical theories (Rustow, 1970; Dahl, 1971), ethnic diversity is often seen as a serious impediment to successful democratization and maintaining healthy democratic regimes. In contrast, the proposed paper will demonstrate that the presence of substantial ethnic minority groups and cross-cutting cleavages have made it very difficult for the populist radical right parties in the Baltic States to form sizable and overarching class coalitions of discontent citizens, which allows them to gain legislative majorities as it has happened in monoethnic Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, we will show that in the Baltic States, ethnic minorities rather seek to bolster the mainstream or liberal pole in party politics because the survival of liberal democratic regimes (defending individual rights and liberties) has become existential for them. Recent studies on democratic backsliding have also often neglected geopolitics. The paper will show that the precarious geopolitical position of the Baltic States, next to Russia, makes it essential for them to maintain strong support from Western democracies and not experiment with illiberal forms of government. Furthermore, those countries have become more ardent supporters of European integration (both at the elite and general population level) than many other CEE countries. The paper will analyze how the war in Ukraine has made the geopolitical imperatives even more salient for the Baltic States and further bolsters the pro-European liberal forces. Although the party-system-related aspects appear to be less connected with the previous issues, they are actually crucial for locking the Baltic States on the liberal path: the excessive party system fragmentation and under-institutionalization have not permitted the populist parties to win legislative majorities in the Baltic countries, to initiate illiberal reforms, violate minority rights, or alter the geopolitical orientation. In contrast, the Hungarian and the Polish party systems have come to resemble the two-party systems, allowing (or potentially allowing) the major illiberal parties (Fidesz and PiS) to rule virtually alone.