Dualistic Distinctions and Conceptualization of Space in Democratic Theory

In his work "Theories of Distinction. Redescribing the distinction of modernity" (2002), Niklas Luhmann (2002) argued that consciousness makes sense of reality by drawing distinctions. While this is a common element of understanding and knowledge production, it does not mean that the distinctions exist in the environment being observed. Creating such divisions can lead to the exclusion of certain parts of a whole, ultimately affecting our perception of the object being studied. This issue has been raised for example by feminist and queer theory scholars who have pointed out that binary categorizations can result in stereotyping and exclusion. Democratic identity-building and emancipation can only occur when such categorisations are undermined and deconstructed. This paper delves into the implications of using dualistic distinctions in democratic theory, with a focus on defining the spaces where democracy takes place. Through an examination of the literature on democratization, political participation, social inclusion, and conceptions of democracy (e.g. representative, participatory, deliberative), I explore how certain distinctions, like public/private, individual/collective, and online/offline, shape the perception of democratic space. These dualistic distinctions are often concealed and/or conceptually interconnected. The more rigidly they are defined the more exclusive and fragmented definitions of democratic space become. However, collapsing these distinctions can make it difficult to define democratic space altogether. This issue is intertwined with matters of societal inclusion and exclusion, given that these classifications – as academic knowledge - heavily influence how society perceives reality. Additionally, it touches on epistemological and ontological debates within democratic theory, which can sometimes become intermingled.