How to Solve the Problem of False Positives Abductively

Immanuel Kant posits that our knowledge of our freedom is based on our awareness of the Categorical Imperative and on the reciprocal implication between the former and the latter. However, for the Reciprocity Thesis to be plausible, it is crucial that the Categorical Imperative, as Kant presents it, is a credible candidate for a proposition from which all moral demands can be derived. But various challenges in applying the Categorical Imperative raise doubts about its candidacy. A particularly intricate and extensively debated issue is that of "false positives"—i.e., of maxims according to which it is obviously impermissible to act although the Categorical Imperative seems to imply the opposite. Apparently, this is due to morally irrelevant details in such maxims, which prevent them from leading to contradictions upon universalization. Many existing solutions have arguably been unsatisfactory. I propose a novel solution to the problem of false positives, along the following lines: Maxims are premises in practical reasoning. On the plausible assumption that the conclusion of a practical inference concerns reasons to perform an action, maxims thus serve as explanations for having such reasons. More precisely, one could assume that a practical syllogism schematically has as its first premise that a particular action is the sole means to maximize the agent’s ends and, secondly, that if this first premise is the case, the agent has a reason to perform the action. The question I want to raise is, how does one come to know such premises of practical reasoning? Since they are explanations, it is reasonable to assume that knowledge of maxims can be obtained only through inferences to the best explanation of why one has reason to perform a certain action. And, therefore, because an explanation is better the more universal it is, one can only know the most universal formulations of maxims. Given this background, the Categorical Imperative can be understood as the demand that it is possible to know the premises of one’s practical reasoning—and not merely to believe them. Consequently, the Categorical Imperative requires to possibly will that one’s maxim become a universal law because only the most general maxims are the best explanations of actions one can know of. This solves the problem of false positives. For there is a unique universal formulation of the second premise of practical reasoning according to the mentioned schema: Necessarily, for every action, every end, and every agent, if the action is the sole means to maximize the agent’s end, then the agent has a reason to perform the action to achieve the end. From this maximally universal formulation of the second premise, all the demands of the Categorical Imperative can be derived, simultaneously resolving the problem of false positives in an elegant manner—since the premise must always be so broadly formulated that no details whatsoever play a role in it. Thereby, this solution can contribute to defending the Categorical Imperative as an indeed plausible candidate for the moral law.