Bureaucratic autonomy through bureaucratic imperialism: The Ministry of Finance as the policy designer in other ministries

Bureaucratic autonomy is the ability of executive agencies to use their discretionary authority to implement policies according to their wishes, even if they were not given a direct mandate from the political authorities and even if interest groups or politicians oppose their activities. Research on bureaucratic autonomy usually examines the ability of executive agencies to expand their mandate and fulfill functions not addressed before by other government agencies. This paper suggests an additional form of bureaucratic autonomy found in ministries of Finance: expanding their mandate to policy design in other departments. Based on the case of the Ministry of Finance in Israel it demonstrates how, without receiving formal directives, the Ministry of Finance became the designer of all the main policy reforms in all the ministries (both social and economic). The paper argues that in addition to the factors enabling bureaucratic autonomy suggested by Carpenter (reputation, legitimacy, organizational capacity), the small number of formal rules guiding the relations between the Ministry of Finance and the social ministries provides the Ministry of Finance with the ability to interfere in the ministries’ policy making. The paper tests this proposition using various data: in-depth interviews with officials in the Ministry of Finance and the line ministries, data on the appearances of the representatives of the Ministry of Finance in the parliament, cabinet decisions, and committee reports. The paper expands our understanding of bureaucratic autonomy, placing it in the context of interministerial relations.