Prefiguration and the internal dynamics of social movements

We can draw the following distinction amongst the aspects of social movements that have been analyzed by social and political theorists. First, there are those that relate to what you might call the external dynamics of social movements. These features concern the relations between social movements and phenomena outside of the social movement. Examples include the question of what causes social movements should pursue, the question of whether individuals have moral duties to join social movements, and the moral constraints imposed on social movements by general moral values and relations. Second, there are those features that concern relations within social movements. Examples include the question of whether members of social movements owe each other special duties and the question of whether members of social movements share responsibility for the actions of other members of the movement. Call these the internal dynamics of social movements. While the external and internal dynamics of social movements are typically considered separately, there are some who emphasize the relationship between them. According to those who advocate prefiguration, the ends of a social movement should be reflected in its means and internal relations. Indeed, some claim that it is not in fact possible to mobilize to advance a social cause via means that are misaligned with that cause. Call this the prefiguration thesis. One implication of the prefiguration thesis, if it is true, is that those social movements that have social justice as their end must model social justice internally. Very few would deny that it would be a good thing if social movements were internally just. But what the prefiguration thesis implies is that justice within social movements is valuable, at least in part, because without it the pursuit of justice outside the movement would not be possible. My first aim in this paper will be to examine and ultimately reject the prefiguration thesis. My claim is not that social movements should not be internally just. Rather, my claim is that the prefiguration thesis does not provide a persuasive explanation of the value justice within social movements. My second aim will be to suggest an alternative explanation of this value. I will argue that justice within social movements is valuable, at least in part, because this is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for the members of social movements to have special duties to one another. My third aim will be to show that the conditions for the members of social movements to have special duties to each other also help to explain why members of social movements share responsibility for each other’s actions.