Even though there is no lack of studies identifying trends of ‘de-parliamentarisation’, ‘post-parliamentarism’, or even ‘post-democracy’ (to name but a few), at least two fundamental questions with respect to parliamentary change in established democracies remain heavily disputed: How can we assess parliamentary change? Which trends in parliamentary change can be identified? This paper argues that the major reason underlying these desiderata is the lack of an integrated framework for analysing parliaments. Research on parliamentary change aiming to find satisfying answers to these questions needs to encompass four interrelated innovations, which the literature on parliamentary change as it stands fails to integrate: Firstly, we need to examine institutional development of parliaments rather than institutional choice within parliaments. Parliamentary ‘power’ is no simple function of the nominal rights these enjoy, for instance, vis-à-vis governments. Rather, we need to assess the adoption of (ambiguous) rules over extended periods of time. This shifts attention to, secondly, the sequencing of basic conflicts about parliamentary reform. Do these reforms only take place in the context of debates about parliamentary efficiency, or are they paralleled by debates about the legitimacy of parliaments? Thirdly, parliaments need to be studied not only as rule-following institutions, but also as resources-based organisations. Why do some parliaments expand organisationally whereas others do not? Fourthly, decisions about parliamentary design need to be analysed in the context of decisions on other constitutional rules, most importantly the electoral system (but also questions of federalism, referenda etc.). An analysis of two contrasting cases (Britain and Germany) defies the alleged decline of parliamentary power and gives rise to the question whether there is a trend towards institutional and organisational convergence amongst Western European parliaments. Furthermore, both cases jeopardise the assumption that parliamentary rules are endogenous to their institutional context.
