Understanding securitisation when applied by EU regional powers: Comparative analysis of the Italian and French security policies in North Africa

The aftermath of the Arab Spring has evidenced the EU inability to adopt specific security policies that could have decreased the regional instability and address the question of the regional securitisation. In particular, Libya was one of the main states in North Africa that suffered a significant downgrade of its domestic and foreign security, with massive flows of migrants and an ongoing civil war hampering the country’s recovery. Among the main EU middle powers that have developed direct approaches to reduce the impact of the Libyan crisis in the Mediterranean, Italy and France have approached the securitisation of Libya in different ways. Middle powers are becoming strategic players in the multipolar world, going beyond the mere multilateral strategy and seeking a more entrepreneurial role in the various regional environments. Within the EU, there are several states that enjoy such categorisation, but few analyses have directly compared how these powers intervene in the same environment. Indeed, after the populist uprisings and the flows of migrants, Italy and France have simultaneously recognised the strategic necessity to intervene in Libya. Yet, few sources have investigated if their securitisation has actually managed to increase the geopolitical stability in Libya. In this context, the article aims to answer the following questions: How have Italy and France applied security policies in Libya? Has the regional competition altered Rome and Paris’ securitisation in Libya? To answer these questions, the paper follows a theoretical framework based on the comparative foreign policy and on the descriptive framework of middle powers’ role during crises. In terms of methodology, the analysis adopt a combined qualitative approach based on a comparative analysis and a systemic-impact approach that investigate how Italy and France as middle powers have evolved securitisation policies in Libya and secondly, how their securitisation have impacted on the broad Mediterranean. Recovering primary data, the analysis adopts a documentary analysis of the Italian and French ministries. The paper asserts that Italy and France have developed two different form of securitisation towards Libya, with Rome preferring a multilateral approach based on the EU security norms, while France has favoured a bilateralism that aimed to increase its regional authority. The paper also contends that due the different approaches, the diplomatic collision between France and Italy over the management of the Libyan crisis has allowed non-EU external powers, such as Türkiye and Egypt, to reduce the effectiveness of their foreign policy. Finally, the analysis concludes that the crisis in Libya demonstrates how Italy and France as regional powers to not always follow the EU securitisation policies, favouring an opportunistic strategy.