Gamson's Law in the City Hall: The Populist Radical Right and the Dilemma of Allocating Municipal Portfolios in Sweden

Does the proportional distribution of office payoffs between coalition partners, known as 'Gamson's Law', hold at the local level? Moreover, can the inclusion of a populist radical right (PRR) party in a coalition lead to deviations from this law? This article addresses these two questions by examining municipal coalitions that were formed following the 2022 Swedish elections. Drawing on new data regarding the party affiliation of municipal committee chairs, we demonstrate that 'Gamson's Law' is highly relevant at the municipal level in Sweden. Hence, local coalition partners tend to distribute committee payoffs based on each member's share of seats in the coalition. This result underscores an intruiging similarity between the dynamics of coalition payoffs at both the national and local levels. However, we find that the populist radical right Sweden Democrats (SD) face, on average, a disproportional allocation unmatched by any other party. While they participate in many right-wing municipal coalitions, they tend to be remarkably underrepresented in terms of office positions. Examining the proportionality of the coalitions themselves, we find that the inclusion of the SD is by far the most substantively significant factor driving disproportionality, even when controlling for traditionally identified factors such as the 'small party bias' or bargaining power. Building on qualitative fieldwork, we argue that this significant deviation from 'Gamson's Law' can be explained by the mainstreaming process of the party. We suggest that relinquishing office positions corresponds to a specific price that the PRR is willing to pay to enter municipal coalitions, and we show that this price extensively benefits the mainstream right Moderate party. Indeed, the party enjoys an extremely favourable allocation within these coalitions, which could contribute to driving their formation. However, while the Moderates can constrain the SD to accept such a distribution, by threatening to form alternative grand coalitions with the Social Democrats, we argue that this blackmail power remains limited. Grand coalitions, while common at the local level in Sweden (contrary to the national level), tend to generate unfavourable allocations for the mainstream right. Rather, we suggest that the SD accept this distribution for two principal reasons. First, to facilitate bargaining by proving to be reliable partners. Second, to gain competency locally before claiming these positions in the next electoral period. This article contributes to a growing body of literature examining the relevance of 'Gamson's Law' at the municipal level. We extend previous findings by demonstrating that this law also applies in Sweden. Furthermore, we identify a new pattern of deviation related to the inclusion of a PRR party in a coalition. These results encourage future researchers to explore the PRR's impact on local coalitions. Additionally, future studies should investigate this deviation from 'Gamson's Law' across a wider range of cases and over longer timeframes, potentially in diverse local contexts.