Competing to win the autocrats: the mistaken assumptions of EU policies

Competing donor activities may be an explanation for the increasing autocratization of low and middle-income countries. This paper aims to advance the theoretical understanding of competing donor activities in three ways. I will argue that the nature of such competition is misunderstood and that this is based on misreading the motives of the autocrats as well as the EU. This opens for alternative explanations of autocratization. A dominant narrative sees the traditional and non-traditional donors as involved in a struggle to provide attractive support for autocrats. The behavior of the autocrats is explained in terms of “survival strategies”, which make the autocrats choose the support which fits best with the strategy. If the autocrats are seen as driven by “strategies of survival and modernization”, other rationalities will follow. One support for this perspective is the analysis by Francis Fukuyama, where he sees three patterns of modernization. Applied to Africa, the most interesting strategy is by autocrats who build states and eventually the rule of law, before democracy. An implication is that the EU should diversify its democracy support to acknowledge the possibility of collaborating with autocrats on modernization in terms of state-building and the rule of law. It would be an example of promoting “good enough governance” and institutions for economic development. A supporting argument is that countries focusing on democracy first will likely run into problems of clientelism. This makes such a focus less attractive. A second common assumption is that development aid is treated as an independent policy field in the EU and elsewhere. An alternative perspective is to see it as an instrument of foreign policy, where goals of a higher ranking take over, for example forming alliances in the UN. An integrated view of the EU policies will make it easier to treat relations with autocrats as a negotiation process with multiple formats. A third assumption, which helps explain policy failures of the EU, is the belief in asymmetry, that the EU contributes most of what is valuable in the relationship (money), rather than seeing the EU as dependent on qualified information to achieve its goals. Acknowledging mutual dependency leads to other strategies being rational. A side-effect of the assumption of asymmetry is the strong expansion of development policy and organizations to deliver support, without much attention to outcomes. Another consequence is the low interest of the EU in the impact of its policies. The EU is excessively focused on its ambitions and spending patterns, while the analysis of outcomes, strategies and implementation, as well as learning from experience, is underdeveloped. A tentative conclusion is that the EU will reach its long-term goals – achievement of the SDGs in poor countries – by accepting the role of some autocrats in the modernization of their countries, especially state-building and economic development. This will likely lead to a higher level of democracy than a more direct strategy. Hence, the paper will provide a more nuanced view of the role of the EU in the ongoing autocratization.