Exploring the radical implications of a functional account of the global commons

Confronted with the finding that we are increasingly exceeding the “planetary boundaries” within which Earth remains habitable for humans, Johan Rockström et al. have recently proposed to extend the scope of the global commons to the “planetary commons”. These would include not just areas beyond national jurisdiction (the high seas, deep seabed, Antarctica, and outer space), but also areas where “all states and peoples have collective vested interests that they be protected and governed effectively for the collective good” (Rockström et al. 2024, 1). In this article, we examine this proposed transition from the global commons, essentially defined as states’ leftovers, to the planetary commons, defined by their role in sustaining life on Earth. We suggest that a functional dimension of the global commons—with the sea as the paradigmatic case—was already present in their early conceptualization as res communis. Indeed, Hugo Grotius argued that the sea was res communis because it cannot not be occupied and because it naturally lends itself to common use without negatively impacting the use of others (based on inexhaustibility). This functional dimension has since been proven incorrect as technological developments and the Earth’s growing population have exposed the global commons as exhaustible. However, the idea that part of what it means to be a global commons is to provide some relevant function for all of humanity reemerged in the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s, this was expressed as a call for the equitable distribution of the benefits of resource exploitation in them for socio-economic reasons (see Arvid Pardo’s proposal for the institutionalization of the global commons as Common Heritage of Mankind). Towards the turn of the century, and faced with growing global environmental problems, the focus changed to their environmental function. The work of Christopher Joyner illustrates this transition. Joyner maintains the understanding that the global commons are areas beyond states’ sovereignty but adds to this the notion that the negative effects of their abuse and mismanagement and the positive effects of their protection are experienced universally (Joyner 1998, 45). By limiting the global commons only to areas that are both of global importance and not yet under national control, we argue that Joyner unnecessarily constrains their reach. Yet, we also claim that—taken to its logical conclusion—the planetary commons proponents’ proposal would result in far broader inclusion of areas and resources than they seem to realize. We point to some radical implications of understanding the global commons in this planetary manner and suggest a way forward that avoids both underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. Finally, we reflect on what adopting the framework of the planetary commons could mean for the ocean as a distinct political space. On the one hand, it could (further) reinforce the prominent role of terrestrial concepts (like sovereignty and ownership) in our thinking about the ocean. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the ocean as a distinct space could inform our thinking about the terrestrial planetary commons.