The role of emotions in EU's foreign policy

Populists’ deep-seated discrepancies on core policy objectives rise as a huge challenge for them to cooperate in the EU. This is particularly the case in CFSP and CSDP. They have internal divisions on a very wide variety of issues, ranging from the need to establish more European civilian and military missions, towards the categorization of Russia as a threat or as a strategic partner. These striking differences in populists’ foreign policy objectives reveal a more complex puzzle. Political actors enact different narratives to sustain the policy objectives that they defend publicly. Nonetheless, the sharp differences in their approach towards foreign policy suggests a very complex picture to trace the foreign policy identity that they seek to project for the EU. In this regard, emotions have been found to be highly relevant factors in driving and reinforcing political identities in the EU, particularly in times of crisis or widespread violations that the EU deems to be relevant. The Ukrainian war brings relevance to this issue since it represents a significant challenge to core EU rules, however there is very little knowledge on the kind of emotions that populist political parties have sought to enact to justify their narratives. This is the reason why, this PhD asks the following questions: What are the emotional norms employed by populist MEPs to justify their position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war since 2022? In light of the Russia-Ukraine war, what are the EU foreign policy identities that populist MEPs have tried to promote through the use of emotions in the European Parliament?. Since emotions are considered inter-contextual, to answer these questions I will analyse populists MEPs discourses in the European Parliament by relying on claims analysis and representative claims analysis. These two methods will allow me to embed the discourse in their given context and simultaneously study the use of emotions. I shall argue that we need to disentangle the thin-centred ideologies from the thick-centred ideologies of populist political parties. The thin centred ideologies will probably reveal that they divide society in two separate spheres: An antagonistic elite whose interests are against those of the people. Nonetheless, the nature of the elite and the people will vary according to their thick centred ideology. By asking these questions I aim to contribute to the ever-growing body of populists in foreign policy, and the use of emotions in foreign policy.