The ‘Mother of all Reforms’? Understanding the proposal for the introduction of the direct election of the Prime Minister in Italy during the Meloni government

Together with the Netherlands, Italy is the only other West European country whose main party of government – the ‘Brothers of Italy’ (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI), led by Giorgia Meloni – is usually classified as a Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP). But while the Dutch government is led by an Independent Prime Minister and has no aim to reform the constitution, the Italian situation is rather different. First, as the country where Fascism was born, Italy has a constitution which gives few powers to the Prime Ministers, in the name of the so-called ‘tyrant’s syndrome’. FdI has post-fascist roots and Meloni has long expressed her admiration for illiberal leaders such as Viktor Orbán (or Donald Trump). In Europe, Hungary is the textbook case for democratic backsliding, caused by executive aggrandizement. Understandably enough, Meloni’s closeness to Orbán has raised concerns for Italy following the Hungarian path. Second, it is at least since the massive party system change experienced in the early 1990s that Italy is engaged in institutional engineering, especially aimed at increasing government stability, and achieving decentralization and clearer mechanisms of accountability. At the same time, several reforms have failed, either to be approved, or to achieve their aims (Baldini 2017). Third, and more generally, institutional reforms are particularly complex because they involve the rules of the game (Flinders 2009). FdI leads a coalition with Forza Italia and the League, that have different priorities, respectively aimed to the direct election of the Prime Minister (the so-called ‘premierato’; Improta & Marzi 2024), the separation of judicial roles and the strengthening of ‘Asymmetric Regionalism’. While institutional reforms were not identified as a priority by the electorate in 2022 (Itanes 2022), centre-right voters are more supportive of strengthening the executive (even if FdI has initially hinted to Presidentialism or Semi-presidentialism). In November 2023, commenting the first draft law on the ‘premierato’ approved by the cabinet, Meloni defined it ‘the mother of all reforms’, referring to government instability as one of the main Italian problems, exemplified by the fact that the country had as many as 12 different Prime Ministers in the previous 20 years. Among these, Silvio Berlusconi (2006) and Matteo Renzi (2016), had both seen their constitutional reform projects – also aimed at strengthening the executive – defeated by two Referendums, an element which might contribute to explain why, a year after Meloni’s announcement, this reform has been delayed. Recent literature has underlined continuity with the previous government led by Mario Draghi (2021-22), in crucial areas such as in economic and fiscal policies (Di Carlo & Simoni 2024, 218). Similarly, ‘pragmatism’ has so far prevailed also in foreign policy (Fasola & Lucarelli 2024). Against such background, the paper focuses of the ‘premierato’ to explain the trajectory of a reform which has experienced a rather complicated navigation, when one thinks that the symbolic investment made by the governing coalition has achieved little; i.e. the ‘big talk’ has so far turned out in very short – and rather tortuous – walk.