Domestic and External Actors and the Implementation of EU Anti-Corruption Policy in Candidate Countries: An Analytical Model

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, enlargement has re-emerged as a political priority for the European Union (EU). With Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine joining the Western Balkan states as candidate countries, scholarly attention has refocused on the EU's 'transformative' role in the regions. Given the rule of law backsliding that can be observed in both EU member states and candidate countries, the EU is putting increasing focus on ensuring robust institutions that can withstand pressure from corrupt practices. While the prevailing notion that has underpinned the Europeanisation literature thus far has underscored the importance of a credible membership perspective as a means of driving reform (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004), data from the WB and the EN regions indicate that the Associated Trio has performed better than the Western Balkans in terms of fight against corruption even without the membership perspective. This raises questions regarding the conditions under which the EU can successfully promote the implementation of anti-corruption policies in these regions. This paper proposes an analytical model to understand the complex interplay between domestic and external actors in the implementation of anti-corruption policies The model examines the degree of implementation of anti-corruption policies as the as a function of the cost of adaptation, access to policy-making by elites and society, and norm internalisation. The cost of adaptation refers to the economic costs that domestic actors face when implementing anti-corruption policies (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Access to policy-making examines the inclusivity and transparency of the policy-making process, and whether certain groups are better represented than others. Norm internalisation consists of the extent to which anti-corruption norms are embedded within society and institutions. These variables influence the domestic equilibrium which affects the domestic actors’ preferences regarding anti-corruption implementation (Treisman, 2000: Rothstein, 2011). The model combines rationalist and constructivist perspectives to help us understand the strategic calculations of domestic actors, while also accounting for how norms and ideas influence their behaviour. It seeks to identify how external actors such as the EU and Russia, influence and the behaviour of domestic actors to either support or hinder anti-corruption policies. The aim of this paper is to provide a model for a more nuanced understanding of the conditions which influence rule compliance with EU-promoted anti-corruption policies, with a particular emphasis on the role of domestic actors and external pressures.