In order to bridge the gap between citizens and decision-makers, the European institutions have taken a variety of measures to increase interest group participation in European policy-making. However, the democratic potential of interest group participation crucially depends on the internal configuration of interest groups. As one of the main aims of interest groups is to influence policy-making, we expect that interest groups need to adapt their internal organizational structures to the institutional environment as suggested by the logic of influence (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). We therefore hypothesize that all interest groups, irrespective of their type or the interest they represent, are characterized by a considerable degree of professionalization. We test our theoretical expectations drawing on a comprehensive survey conducted among interest groups lobbying the European Commission. Our study aims at opening the black box of interest groups – or ‘civil society organizations’ at the EU level to understand the internal configuration of interest groups. The study will be based on public and private interest groups, thus going beyond the sole study of business interests which has largely dominated previous interest group research. The results of this analysis will provide us with important insights in order to assess the democratic potential of interest group inclusion in European policy-making. Given that the debate on interest group participation in decision-making processes as a remedy for the alleged democratic deficit is implicitly based on the idea that these groups – or ‘civil society organizations’ – represent the demands of citizens and not of functionaries, it is crucial to assess the professionalization patterns of interest groups.
