Italy after 2022: autocratization trends and democratic responses

When does a process of democratic decline begin? The literature on regime change has advanced considerably over the past decade. Significant progress has been made in measuring variations in democracy levels to expand the conceptual intent and empirical referents of processes of democratic decline or events of democratic breakdown. Rather than a simplistic consideration of a one-year shift between democratic/autocratic regime-types, the existing literature correctly considers democratization and autocratization as (open-ended) processes with various conclusions. Much of this sophistication is achieved using detailed expert-survey data. However, how to measure autocratization as democratic regression with “hard” data close to everyday politics remains somewhat unclear. When does autocratization begin in practice? What is the amount of empirical evidence of policies endangering democratic quality that can be considered the beginning of autocratization? And also, especially in the early stages of an autocratization process, what are the structural and agency-based factors of democratic resilience and resistance that can withstand a deterioration in democratic quality? The paper focuses on the crucial case of Italy under Giorgia Meloni’s government (2022-). In line with its neo-fascist origins, Meloni's government has approved policies potentially undermining democratic quality, targeting the rule of law (relaxing rules related to corruption), accountability (attacking the judiciary, non-loyal media and opponents), and rights (especially of vulnerable groups). Among other proposals, particularly dangerous is an institutional reform strengthening the Prime Minister's prerogatives over Parliament and the President of the Republic. Are these aspects a sign of the beginning of an autocratization process? And how does Italian democracy respond to such a challenge? The paper is articulated in three parts. The first part compares Italy's democratic quality with established democracies, using a large set of expert-based and observable data. It draws a parallel between the Italian experience and other democracies undergoing (and shortly before) autocratization episodes to compare how declines in aspects of democratic quality can be related to autocratization onset. The second part corroborates that with a closer focus on Italy, and provides various data supporting the expectation that Italian democratic quality is deteriorating in the last years, making extensive use of case-based information from research institutes, NGOs, newspapers, and official documents. The third part substantiates the debate on democratic resilience and resistance by mapping in this specific case those structural variables (economic solidity, institutional integrity, etc.) and specific agents (political opposition, courts, and some media outlets) that oppose the autocratic pressures of the incumbent government. The paper outlines their main strategies as well as their potential room for maneuver. The paper’s overall contribution is twofold: it proposes a protocol for measuring autocratization onset (with both expert-based and observable data on democratic quality); and it advances the debate on the status of Italian democracy, with a focus on some actions of the incumbent government and its current opponents.