In parliamentary situations where no single party wins majority coalition formation is a necessity. Three possible scenarios exist: 1) Formation of a majority coalition government, 2) formation of a single party minority government that governs through the formation of legislative coalitions, or 3) formation of a minority coalition government that governs through the formation of legislative coalitions. The latter is the most complicated situation as coalition coordination is needed both within the government coalition and within the legislative coalitions, including at least one party outside government. Hence, the coordination of the government coalition may be disturbed by coalition bargaining with parties in opposition. This complicated situation is common in the case of Denmark. By studying coalition governance in Denmark we learn how coalition coordination is handled in situations where coalition formation and coordination takes place on different – and sometimes conflicting – levels. A key element in coalition coordination is coalition agreements, which to a varying degree constrains the behavior of the coalition partners. This paper explores the share of laws which were precisely defined in government agreements and/or legislative agreements and sets out to explain variation in this share of coalition-agreement-based laws. The analyses are based on unique data on legislative as well as governmental coalition agreements entered into by four Danish governments which vary in terms of parliamentary strength and party leadership. This study brings the blooming literature on coalition agreements one step further by including legislative coalition agreements and their interaction with governmental coalition agreements.
