ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Western Fatigue? The influence of the Russian invasion on far-right parties in Europe

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Comparative Politics
Democracy
European Union
Political Parties
Populism
Public Policy
European Parliament
Adam Holesch
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals – IBEI
Aron Buzogany
Freie Universität Berlin
Adam Holesch
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals – IBEI
Piotr Zagórski
SWPS University

Abstract

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal shift in European political dynamics, particularly for parties that were previously sympathetic to the Putin regime. Initial assessments of far-right populist parties revealed a notable increase in assertiveness toward Russia; however, some of these parties have adopted, at best, a neutral stance. Contrary to expectations of farright unification following the 2024 European Parliament elections, the far-right bloc remains divided between the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the newly formed Patriots of Europe. This article examines how varying levels of assertiveness toward Russia have influenced this ongoing division within the far-right in two stages. First, building on the authors' prior research, we analyse major resolutions on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine during the first year of the European Parliament's 10th legislative cycle, beginning in 2024. Our analysis includes not only the final votes but also votes on individual paragraphs, amendments, and split votes. We then focus on Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and Justice (Poland), two parties that, between 2015 and 2023, formed a backsliding coalition, protecting each other at the Council and European Council levels. In this analysis, we use a broader time frame (2022-2025) and a wider analytical scope, examining not only EP votes during this period but also the 2024 EP electoral campaign and the national parliamentary electoral campaigns in Hungary (2022) and Poland (2023). We find that while the invasion initially helped bridge some of the longstanding divides within the far-right on Russian policy, these gaps have since widened again. For Fidesz and Law and Justice, the Russian invasion initially froze relations between the backsliding parties, but these relations have since improved significantly.