The International Engagement of Far-Right Parties with Russia and China

Far-Right parties have become influential actors in global politics. In recent years, their electoral success and rise to office in many countries has profoundly shaped domestic policies and politics and in many cases led to democratic backsliding. Even where they remain in opposition, their ideas and positions have often been co-opted by mainstream parties, exerting indirect influence on domestic governance. Moreover, far-right parties have increasingly operated on a transnational level and established themselves in multilateral institutions, despite their criticism or outright hostility toward these institutions. The success of far-right parties has not only created concerns because of their open contestation of domestic liberal-democratic institutions, but also because of the relationship between some of those parties and foreign actors. Various far-right parties maintain ties with Russia – and, to a lesser extent, China. They often promote narratives that do not only correspond to their own illiberal agenda but are also in line with the geopolitical interest of foreign actors. However, other far-right parties have a clear Atlanticist stance, including a profound distrust towards Russia and other foreign actors. This demonstrates that the (Western) European far right is not a monolithic block on matters of foreign policy. This article seeks to address this topic and explores the international politics of the West European far-right, focusing on their relationships with Russia and China. Drawing on desk research, supported and complemented by expert interviews, it systematically maps the ties that exist between nativist, authoritarian, and populist parties represented in the European Parliament between 2019 and 2024 and Russia and China, identifying common patterns as well as differences in their foreign policy outlook. A particular emphasis is placed on the international network of far-right actors when interacting with foreign powers, as well as the involvement of non-elected figures, such as parliamentary staff and far-right activists. By examining these dynamics, this article contributes not only to our understanding of far-right parties’ foreign policy orientation, but also sheds light to transnational cooperation processes between far-right parties when interacting with Russia and China.